A multicriteria group choice problem is considered in the paper. The model includes a set of feasible alternatives, a vector criterion, and n preference relations of the decision makers (DMs). Each preference relation is a cone relation with corresponding properties. It is considered the majority preference relation, as a cone relation constructed upon the cones of the DMs' preference relations. It is shown how to use and aggregate additional information about the DMs' preference relations in case of three DMs and two criteria. The Pareto set of multicriteria problem with "new" vector criterion forms a group choice, which reduces the Pareto set of initial multicriteria problem.
Introduction
Problems of choice are considered in deferent areas of human life, and most of them are multicriteria. Wishes and preferences are extremely varied, even opposite to each other. For example, searching the most profitable solution could lead us to the solution with great losses at the same time, and vice versa.
A multicriteria group choice problem includes a group of decision makers (DMs) with individual preferences, which should be aggregated by some method, rule to make a choice [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] . The individual preferences can be represented by ranking, estimations of experts, preference relations, utility functions. One of the main problem is how to make consistent individual preferences, what should be considered as a "good" decision. A. Bergson, P. Samuelson proposed a social welfare function as a model of individual aggregation, K. J. Arrow formulated 5 axioms for individual preference relations, which restricted the "reasonable" group choice, and Arrow paradox is said that there is not an aggregation rule satisfied this axioms 1 . M.A. Aizerman and F.T. Aleskerov proposed the axioms of "reasonable" group (collective) choice for individual choice functions 2 . B.G. Mirkin investigated problems of preference descriptions, consistency principle of individual preferences, properties of majority rule and its modifications 4 . A model considered in the paper includes a set of feasible alternatives, a vector criterion reflecting the goals of the group, and preference relations of DMs. Information about preference relation of the DM (the individual preferences) is given by "quanta" of information 9, 10 , so preference relation of the DM is characterized by a convex pointed cone, which contains nonnegative orthant, and does not contain the origin. For aggregating the individual preference relations is used the majority preference relation, which takes into account at least half intensions of members of the group. It is proved that this relation is characterized by the unions of the intersections of different subsets selected from the set of cones associated with the DMs' preference relations. Generally, derived in this way cone can be either convex or not. The property of convex is equivalent to transitivity of corresponding relation. Thus, the goal is to construct a convex part of the majority preference relation cone, and it gives the transitive part of this relation.
When there is not any "quantum" of information, the Pareto set forms the group choice, i. e. each DM has not any additional information. For three DMs and two components of vector criterion it is considered two cases: when each DM have only one "quantum" of information, and when it has two "quanta" of information. And it is established what consists the group choice in each case: it is the Pareto set of multicriteria problem with "new" vector criteria, and it belongs to the Pareto set of initial multicriteria problem. Note that in one considered situation this choice is not unique. It happens, when the cone of the majority preference relation is not convex.
Multicriteria choice model of the DM
Consider the group consists of n DMs: DM 1 , …, DM n. A set of feasible alternatives, solutions k XR  is a set of variants among which the choice should be made by the group. A vector criterion f, defined on X, Y = f(X), reflects goals, intensions of the DMs, and it is the same for each DM. Now let us formulate the main objects of multicriteria group choice problem:
n also reflects intensions all DMs but they are not equal to each other, i. e. for any {1, , } ln  DM l has its own preference relation Y l , defined on Y. The expression (1) (2) Y l yy means that when considering two vectors y (1) , y (2) the DM l chooses y (1) and rejects y (2) . Suppose that behavior of any DM l is restricted by the axioms of "reasonable" individual choice 9 . They are as follows. It is assumed that when considering two possible variants the excluded vector could not be selected from the whole set Y as well. To have the opportunity to compare the random vectors (not only from the set Y), and thus provide information about the preference relation, it is introduced an irreflexive and transitive continuation l to the entire criterion space m R for the latter. In addition, all components f 1 , …, f m of vector criterion are compatible with preference relation l . The ith criterion f i is called compatible with preference relation l if for any vectors y (1) , y (2) of the space m R such that (1) (1)
(1)
(2) ii yy  , the relation (1) (2) l yy holds. It means that the DM is interested in increasing value of each criterion while values of others criteria are constant. Thus, it is outlined the class of multicriteria individual choice problem, and it is developed the Pareto set reduction axiomatic approach by V.D. Noghin applied to this class [9] [10] [11] [12] . It is shown 9 that under assumption the axioms of "reasonable" choice being valid, the Edgeworth -Pareto principle for any DM l is hold. It is said that the "best" solution should be chosen only within the set of Paretooptimal vectors (the Pareto set) P(Y). Here, ( To specify the individual choice within the Pareto set it is given some additional information about the preference relation l of the DM l . It is introduced notation of "quantum" of information 9, 11, 12 . Following it let us recall the definition. Definition 1. It is said that we have a "quantum" of information about the DM l 's preference relation l with groups of criteria A and B and with two sets of positive parameters () l i w for all iA  and () l j w for all jB  if for all vectors (1) (2) , . Taking it into account it is shown 8 that in Definition 1 the vectors y (1) , y (2) can be assumed to be fixed, in particular, we can put (1)
. So, the existence of "quantum" of information means that it is given a vector
. In papers [9] [10] [11] [12] in order to specify the individual choice it is shown how to use collections of "quantum" of information of different types, which according to the aforementioned could be defined by the sequence of vectors
And if there exists the preference relation l satisfied the axioms of "reasonable" choice such that () s lm y0 for any {1, , } ln  , then such information about the DM l 's preference relation is called consistent 9 . The inconsistent information could not be used in decision making process. The criteria of consistency are derived 9 . The main idea of the Pareto set reduction axiomatic approach is to construct a set, which will restrict a "new" bound of individual choice using the given information. And such bound is more precise, than the Pareto set.
The majority preference relation
Definition 2. A binary relation  defined on m R is called a cone relation if it is existed a cone K such that the following equivalent is hold for any (1) (2) ,
Remark that the inclusion
is the same to (1)
. It is proved 9 that the preference relation which satisfies the axioms of "reasonable" choice is a cone relation with a pointed convex cone (without the origin 0 m ) that contains the nonnegative orthant
For that reason the preference relation l of the DM l for any l = 1, …, n is a cone relation with abovementioned preferences. Denote such cone K l for each l . Consider a group preference relation, which takes into account the intentions of at least a half of the group. For example, if for some vectors (1) (2) ,
yy , …, (1) (2) q yy are valid, where q is greater than n/2, then the relation (1) (2) yy holds. Definition 3. Let us call the group preference relation defined on m R the majority preference relation if for any vectors (1) (2) ,
yy is equivalent to the existence of such subset 
The right hand side inclusion is equivalent to the relation . In such case all three relations , tr , and  coincide, and all vectors of the Pareto set form a group choice. But the reducing this choice is arisen in practice. The goal is to construct a transitive part K of the cone K using "quanta" of information about the DMs' preference relations. The set of nondominated vectors Ndom ( ) tr Y of the set Y according to this transitive part K will be considered as a group choice based on the given "quanta" of information, and Ndom ( ) ( ) tr Y P Y  . So it reduces the bounds of group choice.
Group choice using the majority preference relation in case of 3 DMs and m = 2

Case of one "quantum" of information for each DM
Consider the group consists of 3 DMs, each of them is associated to its preference relation with corresponding cone: DM 1 f 2 ) , it means that m = 2. According to Definition 3 and Lemma 1 the majority preference relation is a cone relation with a cone 
, K  uu , with components (1) (1) (2) cone{ , , } cone{ , } K  e e u e u without the origin 0 2 .
Let us prove that the cone K is convex if and only if (3) . Consider the line l passing through the vector (2) u , its equation is ,0  ny , where
. If the vector (1) u generates an acute angle with the normal vector n, i. e.
(1) (1) (2) (1) (2) 1 2 2 1
,0 u u u u  nu , then the cone K is convex, and it is generated by the vectors e 1 , e 2 , u (1) , u (2) , and does not contain the origin 0 2 . We can conclude that the cone K in case (3) is an arbitrary transitive part of the cone K.
As assumed above the vectors (1) (2) , K  uu , and the cone K is not convex. Hence, there be one of two possibilities: 1) there exists such vector (1)
Consider the second one, for the first one arguments are similar. Obviously,
(cone{ , , } cone{ , }) \ { } K  e e u e v 0 . There exists such number ε > 0 that (2) (1) (2) (2) 12 22
This implies the inequality (1) (2) 
It means that if the cone K is not convex, then it does not exist the maximum transitive part of it. Lemma 3 is proved. Now, let each DM l give a "quantum" of information about its preference relation l , l = 1, 2, 3. Due to this, we have 3 vectors (1) (2) (1) , y (2) , and y (3) . and given "quanta" of information. Theorem 1 is proved. Remark that in the opposite case to Theorem 1, when all second components of the vectors y (1) , y (2) , and y (3) are positive, and all first components are negative, one should renumber the components. Now, consider situation (II): only two vectors have positive component with the same index. (1) and y (2) are not
Theorem 1. Let the situation (I) is hold, and the vectors
(1) (1) 1 (1) 2 w w      y ,(2)
Theorem 2. Let situation (II) is hold, and the vectors
, and
where (1) (1) 
, 0, , 0,  e y y y (6) where (3) 
As a result, we have It means that in situation (II) the cone M is also convex. Thus, we can conclude that the relation M is a transitive part of the majority preference relation , MK  . Using analogous arguments as in Theorem 1 one can ends the proof of the theorem. Theorem 2 is proved.
Remark that if among the vectors y (1) , y (2) , and y (3) there are two vectors with second positive component and first negative component, one should renumber the components to use Theorem 2.
Case of two "quanta" of information for each DM
Now consider the situation, when each DM has two "quanta" of information. Thus, let there exist such vectors (1) (1) (1) , u (2) are not unique. In this case the cone M is not convex, and the proof is based on Lemma 3. Due to the way we choose a convex cone in the cone M, the Pareto set ˆ( ) PY g as a solution of the group choice problem is not unique. And all such Pareto sets are equally "optimal" for the group of the DMs according to the given "quanta" of information about the preference relations 1 ,
